Technological Man takes its place near the top of the long
list of recent books seeking to discern the shape of the future of our
technological society. Prof. Ferkiss sees the problem in terms of a sharp
contrast between the nineteenth century's industrial society, operated by
"industrial man" (that is, a bourgeois society motivated by the individualistic
pursuit of private profits), and the growth of a new "technological society"
which requires a new kind of "technological man" to operate it.
Unfortunately, while the shift of industrial society into
technological society is obvious, there is little evidence of the appearance of
a new kind of man capable of controlling, without disaster, the powers made
available by the rapid advance of science and technology. Ferkiss makes it quite
clear that if bourgeois industrial man continues in control of the new
technological society, the consequence may be catastrophic disaster threatening
the continued existence of humanity as we have known it.
The growing power of the new technology should increase the area of
human freedom and make it possible for man to develop more fully his human
qualities which have been restricted in the past by emphasis on man's animal
needs. Now the burden lies heavily on man "to invent his own future" and to make
what he wishes of himself and his world. "What should be his criteria of
choice?" asks Ferkiss, adding, "In the past, nature and ignorance set limits to
man's freedom and his follies; now they need no longer stand in his way, and
technological man will be free even to destroy the possibility of freedom
itself."
Pessimistic Conclusions
The central core of this volume lies in chapters 6-8, which examine
the interrelationships between technology and, in order, economic; political,
and cultural patterns. The conclusion, in each case, is a pessimistic one; there
is little evidence that any of these areas is changing its patterns in ways more
capable of handling the technology of the future nor of contributing, in any
substantial fashion, toward the creation of a new technological man capable of
doing this.
In this discussion Ferkiss shows his remarkable combination of
talents, including a broad familiarity with the most recent thinking on this
whole vast subject, which stretches from science and technology on one side,
through the newest ideas on economics, political action, and popular culture, to
recent schools of psychology and religion.
Debunking Myths
Ferkiss not only knows this material, but he has the ability to
think about it without emotional or personal bias and without committing himself
to any special point of view or any narrow outlook. His thinking is hard-headed
and skeptical without being materialistic, egocentric, or cynical. His
skepticism reminds me of Crane Brinton, a similarity which extends also to his
verbal style and facility of expression, while his ability to deal with complex
social problems, often from an original point of view, is similar to Kenneth
Galbraith's.
Major portions of the three core chapters are concerned with
debunking contemporary myths about our present condition. These include: That
our economy is becoming a "service economy" rather than a productive one; that
power in it is passing to a "technical" or "scientific elite"; that the economic
future will consist of an unstable mixture of "automation, unemployment, and
affluence; that a "classless society" is emerging; or that suburbia is an
example of this new homogeneous, one-class, single-outlook society. Instead of
these "myths," Ferkiss sees our economic life today moving toward a "riskless,
state-subsidized capitalism" in which "contemporary man is essentially bourgeois
man with new tools and toys."
As might be expected of a political scientist, Ferkiss is most
revealing (and most pessimistic) when he turns to the political aspects of the
situation. He quickly disposes of the double myth that our future will contain a
mass political society under an omnipotent centralized government. On the
contrary, he sees governments becoming increasingly impotent, increasingly
vulnerable to sabotage, and increasingly incapable of making decisions (or even
of formulating the issues) which we must face in the future. He sees both
nations and party systems breaking down from the inability of the political
system to give meaningful direction to society. Existing political systems "have
been unable to structure the issues and to relate them to the decision-making
process in such a way as to enable the popular will to be expressed." This is
especially true of the vital ecological problems of the present and future. This
means, according to Ferkiss, "that certain choices are almost automatically
ruled out, and that man's technological ability to cope with the situation is
destroyed. . . . Then it is obvious that the present political order makes the
emergence of technological man impossible."
The Cultural Scene
A similar pessimism pervades Ferkiss' analysis of the cultural
scene, where he sees nothing contributing to the formation of personality types
capable of dealing with the problems of technological society. On the contrary,
the evidence here leads him to conclude that "the pattern of the future is not
technological man so much as neoprimitive man trapped in a technological
environment. The most certain thing that can be said about the future is that it
will be culturally eclectic; but this could easily mean chaos rather than the
emergence of a new human type."
In this connection, Ferkiss is equally skeptical of the existence
of a sexual revolution, or a revolution of the young, or any significant mass
movement either toward or away from religion. In each case he supports his
skepticism with common-sense evidence which seems obvious, yet is usually
ignored by those who speak of these movements.
Most writers, having reached such pessimistic conclusions about
present tendencies, might have ended on this somber note. But Ferkiss has a deep
understanding of the past of our society, rooted in the Greco-Roman and Hebreo-Christian
traditions, and has the faith, the hope, and the epistemological skills to see a
way out. Accordingly, in his final chapter, which reveals an unusual
understanding of present tendencies, Ferkiss points the way toward the outlook
of "technological man" and gives some indication of how the processes of our
society might move us in the right direction, even while our economic,
political, and cultural patterns continue to move us toward social bankruptcy.
The Technological Man
In brief terms,
Ferkiss sees at least three aspects to the outlook of
technological man: The first would involve recognition that man, while the
culmination of natural evolutionary processes, has gone far beyond material
nature and has risen above simple animal characteristics, while still continuing
as part of nature and of natural processes.
The second involves recognition that all problems are parts of
larger wholes in which solutions must be sought in constantly larger contexts
and even of the whole itself (in sharp contrast with nineteenth century
methodologies, which invariably sought explanation by breaking wholes down into
smaller parts).
The third involves recognition that man, nature, and deity are
three mutually interrelated and intermingled aspects of that largest "whole." I
might point out in passing (although Ferkiss does not do so) that the thinking
revealed in this final chapter involves points of view and implications of
eternal values and of techniques of human understanding which have much in
common with some of the oldest religious thinking of Asia and of the more
neglected aspects of our own Western tradition. Possibly Ferkiss may recognize
this fact for he concludes this stimulating volume with a quotation from Meister
Eckhardt, a German mystic of the fourteenth century, not a source which would
have been used by obsolescent industrial man.
— CARROLL QUIGLEY
